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We challenge the claim that there are distinct neural systems for explicit and implicit memory by demonstrating that a formal single-
system model predicts the pattern of recognition memory (explicit) and repetition priming (implicit) in amnesia. In the current inves-
tigation, human participants with amnesia categorized pictures of objects at study and then, at test, identified fragmented versions of
studied (old) andnonstudied (new) objects (providing ameasure of priming), andmade a recognitionmemory judgment (old vs new) for
each object. Numerous results in the amnesic patients were predicted in advance by the single-system model, as follows: (1) deficits in
recognition memory and priming were evident relative to a control group; (2) items judged as old were identified at greater levels of
fragmentation than items judged new, regardless of whether the items were actually old or new; and (3) the magnitude of the priming
effect (the identification advantage for old vs new items) overall was greater than that of items judgednew.Model evidencemeasures also
favored the single-system model over two formal multiple-systems models. The findings support the single-system model, which ex-
plains the pattern of recognition and priming in amnesia primarily as a reduction in the strength of a single dimension of memory
strength, rather than a selective explicit memory system deficit.
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Introduction
One of the most influential distinctions in the cognitive neuro-
science of memory is between explicit and implicit long-term
memory. Explicit memory refers to conscious recollection of
prior experiences. Implicit memory refers to changes in behavior
that are due to prior experience, but are unaccompanied by con-
scious recollection of those experiences (Schacter, 1987). Implicit
memory is commonly shown via repetition priming, which is a
change or facilitation in identification, production, or detection
of an item (e.g., a picture of an object) as a result of prior exposure
to the same or a similar item. Strikingly, despite profound deficits
in explicit memory tasks such as recognition—in which partici-
pants judgewhether items have been presented before in a certain
context—individuals with amnesia can show normal levels of
repetition priming (Hamann and Squire, 1997). This dissocia-
tion is widely regarded as some of the strongest evidence for the
proposal that functionally and neurally distinct explicit and im-
plicit memory systems exist in the brain: recognition is driven by
an explicit (declarative/conscious) memory system located in the
medial temporal lobes (damaged in amnesia), whereas priming is
driven by implicit (nondeclarative/unconscious) memory sys-
tems in modality-specific neocortical regions (Tulving and
Schacter, 1990; Gabrieli, 1998; Squire, 2009). Of primary interest
here is the proposal that recognition and priming are driven by
distinct explicit and implicit memory sources (Squire, 2009).
An alternative perspective is that recognition and repetition
priming are driven by the same memory system or source. This
view has been formalized in a single-system (SS) model of recog-
nition and priming (Berry et al., 2006, 2008a,b, 2010, 2012;
Shanks and Berry, 2012). Surprisingly, this model can explain
numerous results in healthy adults that on the surface appear to
be indicative of multiple systems; it even predicts results that are
not predicted by multiple-systems versions of the model and can
provide better fits to the data (Berry et al., 2012).
Here we provide a critical test of the SSmodel by applying it to
data from amnesia. We also compare its fit to two formal
multiple-systems models. We test a relatively homogeneous and
well characterized group of amnesic patients that is atypically
large (n  24; Hayes et al., 2012). The patients had Korsakoff’s
syndrome (KS), a chronic disorder that is often caused by severe
alcoholism and thiamine deficiency that results in diencephalic,
frontal, and hippocampal brain damage (Le Berre et al., 2014). It
is characterized by anterograde and retrograde amnesia (Kopel-
man et al., 2009; Fama et al., 2012; Kessels and Kopelman, 2012;
Race and Verfaellie, 2012). Findings from patients with KS have
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played a central role in the formulation ofmultiple-systems views
(Hayes et al., 2012), and implicitmemory is widely regarded to be
preserved in KS (Kopelman et al., 2009; Oudman et al., 2011). In
the current investigation, participants categorized pictures of fa-
miliar objects (e.g., an elephant) at study. In the test phase, par-
ticipants identified fragmented versions of old (studied) and new
objects (providing a measure of priming), and made a recogni-
tion memory judgment (old/new) after identifying each object.
Materials andMethods
Participants.Twenty-four patients (16male;mean age, 50.2 years; SD, 7.7
years)withKorsakoff’s amnesiawere recruited via theKorsakoff Clinic of
the Vincent van Gogh Institute for Psychiatry, Venray, The Netherlands
(KOR group). All patients fulfilled the criteria for alcohol-induced per-
sisting amnestic disorder (American Psychiatric Association, 2000) and
Korsakoff’s syndrome (Kopelman, 2002). The diagnoses were supported
by the patients’ medical history and neuropsychological assessment, and
all participants had anterograde amnesia, performing in the impaired
range on the Rivermead Behavioral Memory Test [RBMT; Wilson et al.,
1989; Van Balen et al., 1996; total profile score: mean score, 6.7; SD, 4.0
(scoring: 17–21, poor memory; 10–16, mildly impaired; 0–9, severely
impaired)], as well as retrograde amnesia for their biographical history.
Premorbid intelligence was estimated using the Dutch version of the
National Adult Reading Test (NART; Schmand et al., 1991), with IQs in
the below-average to average range, which was in agreement with the
patients’ educational levels (mean NART-IQ score, 93.8; SD, 12.5; mean
educational level, 3.9; SD, 1.1), where education level was assessed in
seven categories based on the Dutch educational system, as follows: 1,
primary school; 7, academic degree (Verhage, 1964). Neuroradiological
findings (CT or MRI) showed abnormalities associated with KS, such as
(diencephalic) atrophy or white-matter lesions (Pitel et al., 2012). No
brain abnormalities were found that countered the clinical diagnosis
(e.g., large strokes, tumors). All patients were abstinent from alcohol
since their admittance to the clinic (3months before testing), nonewas
in the acute Wernicke phase of the syndrome, and none fulfilled the
criteria for alcohol-related dementia (Oslin et al., 1998).
The control (CON) group also consisted of 24 individuals, matched in
terms of age (mean age, 50.2 years; SD, 13.6 years; t(46) 0.59, p 0.56),
premorbid IQ (mean NART-IQ score, 96.4; SD, 12.6; t(46)  0.72, p 
0.47), and the proportion ofmales and females. Exclusion criteria for the
control subjects were a self-reported history of neurologic or psychiatric
disorder, or subjective cognitive complaints. Level of education (mean
level, 5.3; SD, 0.8) was significantly higher in the CON group than the
KOR group (Mann–Whitney U  90.50, p  0.01); however, this vari-
able was not found to be significantly correlated with subsequent mea-
sures of recognition or priming performance at test within each group (r
values ranged from0.14 to 0.23).
Materials. The stimuli were 80 color photographs of familiar objects
(e.g., a bicycle, a guitar). All stimuli were presented on a computer mon-
itor against a white background. Each object subtended 7.5° of visual
angle in the horizontal and vertical. Stimuli were arranged into two 40-
item lists. Each list acted as the studied or new stimuli equally often across
participants. Approximately half of the objects in each list were larger
than a shoebox. All instructions were presented in Dutch.
Procedure. During the study phase, participants were told that they
would be presented with pictures of objects and that they must decide
whether each object was smaller or larger in size than a shoebox, indicat-
ing their response with a button press. The sequence of events on each
trial was as follows: (1) a central fixation point (“”) was presented for
2000 ms; (2) the object was then presented for 2000 ms; and (3) if a
response had been made, the next trial then commenced, and if a re-
sponse had not beenmade, a blank screen was presented until a response
was made. For the duration of the study phase, the reminder cue “Is the
object smaller or larger than a shoebox? Z  smaller, M  larger” re-
mained visible toward the bottom of the screen. The order of presenta-
tion of items was randomly determined for each participant. There was a
short (maximum time, 5 min) retention interval before the test phase
commenced, during which standardized tests (e.g., NART) were
administered.
A continuous identification with recognition (CID-R; Stark and
McClelland, 2000) procedure was used to present each item at test. On
each trial, an item was initially presented in an extremely fragmented
form. The instructions for the test phase informed participants that the
object would initially be difficult to identify, but that each press of the
spacebar would reveal a less fragmented version of the object (up to 10
levels; Fig. 1). Their task was to identify each object at the most frag-
mented level possible. Participants were told not to try to identify the
object until they were sure that they could do so. Identification accuracy
was near the ceiling in both groups, although it was higher in the CON
group [proportion of trials correct: CON group: mean, 0.998; KOR
group: mean, 0.958 (excluding one outlier in the KOR group who only
identified 0.49 proportion of trials correctly; the recognition/priming
results reported later are not affected if this participant is excluded)].
Trials on which an incorrect identification occurred were not excluded
from the analysis to preserve recognition data; however, the qualitative
pattern of results did not differ when they were excluded (one exception
to this was that Prediction 3 in the KOR group was only significant on a
one-tailed test). The prompt “Press SPACE to reveal more of the draw-
ing, and press ENTER at the earliest point that you can identify the item
Figure1. Example of a fragmented stimulus used in the identificationportion of a CID-R trial
at test. Anobjectwas initially presented at ahighly fragmented level (level 1). Participantswere
instructed to try to identify the item at the most fragmented level they could. If the item could
notbe identified, abuttonpress revealeda less fragmentedversionof theobject (up to level 10).
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correctly” remained on screen during the clarification procedure. When
participants pressed enter, a black outlined box and prompt (“Type your
response and then press ENTER”) appeared beneath the fragmented
object. After a response was typed, the nonfragmented version of the
object was then presented with the prompt, “Was the object presented in
the first stage? 1 sure no, 2 probably no, 3 probably yes, 4 sure
yes.” After participants made their recognition response, a blank screen
was presented for 2000 ms before the next test trial was presented. There
were 80 trials in total (40 old and 40 new). To evenly distribute old and
new trial types across the test phase, trials were randomly arranged into
four blocks with an equal number of old and new trials in each block
(there was no indication of block transition to participants).
To create fragmented versions of each image, each 400  400 pixel
image was divided into 400 20 20 pixel squares. At each of 10 possible
fragmentation levels, a fixed proportion of the squares containing the
target image was displayed. The proportion of squares displayed at each
fragmentation level, x, was calculated as 0.75 (10x ), x [1, 10]. Thus, the
fragmentation procedure was such that the rate of clarification was rela-
tively slow across the initial fragmentation levels and more rapid in the
later stages. This was done to increase the difficulty of the task in the early
stages of the procedure.
Recognition responses were collapsed across confidence ratings 1 and
2 for “new” judgments, and ratings 3 and 4 for “old” judgments. This was
done because a large proportion of participants made no responses in at
least one of the confidence [(1–4)  item status (old, new)] response
categories (79%of individuals in the KOR group, and 71%of individuals
in the CON group). Recognition performance was measured with Pr,
which was calculated asH F, whereH p(hit), and F p(false alarm);
d	 was also calculated as z(H) z(F)), where a “hit” is an old judgment
to an old item, and a “false alarm” is an old judgment to a new item.
Response bias was measured with C (C0.5[z(H) z(F)]). For the
calculation of d	 and C, a correction was applied when calculatingH and
F for each individual [i.e.,H (no. of hits 0.5)/(no. of possible hits
1), and F  (no. of false alarms  0.5)/(no. of possible false alarms);
Snodgrass and Corwin, 1988]. This enabled the calculation of d	 and C
for participants for whom H or F was equal to 1 or 0. An  level of 0.05
was used for all statistical tests, and all t tests were two tailed, unless
indicated otherwise. Effect sizes are indicated by Cohen’s d (for t tests)
and p
2 (for ANOVA).
Reliability of the recognition and priming measures. Prior research has
shown that it is important to take into account the reliability of the tasks
used tomeasure recognition and priming when comparing performance
(Buchner and Wippich, 2000). Accordingly, the reliability of the recog-
nition and primingmeasures was calculated using split-half correlations.
Each participant’s dataset was split into odd and even trials, and then Pr
and priming measures were calculated for the trials in each of these
halves. The split-half correlation for recognition/priming is the Pearson
correlation of the recognition/priming measures for each half, across
participants. Importantly, both recognition and priming were highly re-
liable (recognition: r(46)  0.91, p  0.001; priming: r(46)  0.56, p 
0.001). The greater reliability of the recognition task is consistent with
previous research (Buchner and Wippich, 2000); however, when each
groupwas analyzed individually, the reliability of recognitionwas greater
than that of priming only in the KOR group, and not the CON group
(where the reliability of recognition and priming was approximately
equal; KOR group: recognition, r(22) 0.84, p 0.001; priming, r(22)
0.47, p 0.02; CONgroup: recognition, r(22) 0.50, p 0.013; priming,
r(22) 0.58, p 0.003).
Formal single-system and multiple-systems models. Full details of the
models are given in the study by Berry et al. (2012). The SSmodel is based
on signal detection theory (Green and Swets, 1966) and assumes that
during the test phase each item is associated with a memory strength
value, f, which is a normally distributed, random variable with mean ()
and SD f [i.e., fN(, f)]. Themean f of old items can be greater than
of new items because of prior study (i.e., oldnew). The value of f for
an item is used to derive its recognition judgment and its measure of
priming. To generate a recognition judgment, random, normally distrib-
uted noise, er, is first added to f to produce the judgment measure Jr [i.e.,
Jr  f  er, where er  N(0, r)]. If Jr exceeds a particular threshold of
strength, C, the item will be judged old, otherwise it will be judged new.
For the priming task, greater values of f will tend to result in better
performance in the task. For example, if the task is to identify fragmented
versions of an object (fragment identification), the greater the value of f
for an item, the greater the level of fragmentation at which it will be
identified. Importantly, however, f is combined with another indepen-
dent source of randomnormally distributed noise, ep, to derive the prim-
ingmeasure [i.e., ID b sf ep, where ID is the level of fragmentation
at which identification occurs; b and s are scaling parameters; b is the ID
intercept; s is the rate of change in ID with f; and epN(0, p)]. Both of
the task-specific noise variables er and ep have mean values equal to zero.
The SS model can be modified to create two “multiple-systems” ver-
sions of the model—the MS1 and MS2 models. The MS1 model is the
same as the SS model except that one “explicit” memory strength signal,
fr, drives recognition [where fr  N(r, f)], whereas a separate “im-
plicit”memory signal, fp, drives priming [where fpN(p,f)]. As in the
SS model, fr and fp are combined with task-specific sources of noise (er
and ep) to produce the recognition judgment (i.e., Jr  fr  er) and
priming measure (i.e., ID b sfp ep). Importantly, however, fr and
fp are uncorrelated [i.e., r( fr, fp) 0], and the mean explicit strength of
old items (rold) can vary independently of themean implicit strength of
old items (rold) across individuals/conditions. This allows themodel to
produce dissociations at the level of individual items (e.g., stochastic
independence; Tulving et al., 1982; Poldrack, 1996) and also at the level
of group/condition (e.g., independent effects of a variable upon recogni-
tion and priming, such as the dissociation in amnesia). Thus, this model
represents a relatively strong interpretation of the idea that explicit and
implicit memory systems are independent (Tulving et al., 1982).
Another model, the MS2 model, represents a weaker interpretation of
the idea that there is independence between systems (Berry et al., 2012).
This model is identical to the MS1 model except that the explicit and
implicit strengths of individual items may be positively correlated (with
correlationw). A correlation could arise, for example, via distinctiveness:
a more distinctive itemmay be better encoded into both the explicit and
implicit memory systems. This gives the MS2 model greater flexibility,
allowing it to reproduce associations between recognition and priming
measures at the level of individual items (like the SS model). In fact, the
MS2 model subsumes the SS and MS1 models as special cases of it, and
theMS2model can therefore, in principle, produce any result that the SS
and MS1 models can achieve (Berry et al., 2012). When the correlation
between fr and fp is 1 [i.e., r( fr, fp) 1], and the mean fr and fp values of
old items are equal (i.e.,roldpold), fr fp, and so themodel reduces
to the SS model; when the correlation between fr and fp is zero [i.e., r( fr,
fp) 0], the model reduces to the MS1 model (Berry et al., 2012).
Model fitting. Models were fit using maximum likelihood estimation
(full details are given in Berry et al., 2012). The likelihood of each iden-
tification level (ID) and judgment (Z) combination is given by the fol-
lowing function:
L
Z,IDX 
CjJrID,X, JrID2 
Cj1JrID,X, JrID2 	


IDb spX,ID2 ,
whereX old, new; is the cumulative normal distribution function;

is the normal density function; ID
2  s2f
2  p
2; JrID,X; and JrID
2 are
the mean and variance of the conditional distribution of Jr given ID, j
1 when Z “new” (N), and j 2 when Z “old” (O); C0, C1
C and C2 . JrID,X and JrID
2 are calculated as follows:
JrID,X rX 
wsf
2
ID b spX)
s2f
2 p
2 ,
and
JrID
2  f
2  r
2
w2s2f
4
s2f
2 p
2,
where rnew 0 when X new, and rold 0 when X old; pnew
0 when X new, andpold 0 when X old. In the SS model,rold
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pold  old, and w  1. In the MS1 model, w  0; in the MS2 model,
0 w 1.
In fitting the models to the data, an automated procedure was used to
find the parameter values that maximize the summed log likelihood
across trials. A full list of parameters (both free and fixed) is given in
Table 1. The values of certain parameters are nonidentifiable and were
therefore fixed such that they act as scaling parameters (Berry et al.,
2012), as follows: SS model, new  0; MS1/MS2 models, rnew 
pnew  0; M(ep) M(er)  0; f  r 0.5; finally, the value of
s in the MS1 andMS2 models was fixed to that of the SS model. Fixing
f and r to0.5 means that the SD of Jr is equal to 1 (because Jr
(f
2  r
2)), and rold can therefore be interpreted as d	. We have
previously shown that whether s is fixed or free to vary in the MS1 and
MS2 models does not affect their fit (Berry et al., 2012).
This leaves the following five free parameters in the SSmodel:old, the
mean strength of the old itemdistribution;C, the old judgment criterion;
b, the ID intercept; s the rate of change in the ID level with changes in f;
andp, the variance of ep, the noise associated with the priming task. The
MS1 model also has the following five free parameters: rold, the mean
explicit memory strength of the old item distribution; pold, the mean
implicit memory strength of the old item distribution; C, the old judg-
ment criterion; b, the ID intercept; and p, the variance of ep. The MS2
model has the following six free parameters: rold, the mean explicit
memory strength of the old item distribution; pold, the mean implicit
memory strength of the old item distribution; C, the old judgment crite-
rion; b, the ID intercept; p, the variance of ep; and w, the correlation
between fr and fp.
It is usually preferable to fit the models to each participant’s data;
however, this was not possible for all participants because the model
parameters could not be estimated for participants who did not make at
least one hit,miss, false alarm, or correct rejection response. Accordingly,
the models were fit to (1) the data aggregated across the 24 participants
within each group and (2) to each individual’s data, providing that the
individual made at least one hit, miss, false alarm, and correct rejection
response (CON group, n  19; KOR group, n  15). We report the
Akaike information criterion (AIC, Akaike, 1973) and the Bayesian in-
formation criterion (BIC, Schwarz, 1978) measures of fit because both
are frequently reported in model comparisons. We place more emphasis
on the AIC because our previous investigations indicated that the true
generativemodel can bemore reliably identifiedwith thismeasure (Berry
et al., 2012).
Given the best-fitting parameter values for a model, the expected
model results can be calculated analytically as follows: P(hit)  1 
(C rold); P(false alarm) 1 (C); d	  rold; E[IDnew] b;
E[IDold] b spold; priming effect spold.
The expected values of ID conditional on judgment Z are given by the
following function:
E
IDZ,X b spX
swf
2
Jr

CjrXJr 
Cj1rXJr 
CjrXJr Cj1rXJr 
,
where Jr(f
2 r
2); j 1 when Z N; and j 2 when Z O;
C0; C1 C; and C2. Thus, the equation gives the expected ID
of hits (E[IDH]) when X  old and Z  O; it gives the expected ID of
false alarms (E[IDF]) when X new and ZO. Similarly, the equation
gives the expected ID of misses (E[IDM]) when X old and ZN; and
it gives the expected ID of correct rejections (E[IDCR]) when X new
and Z N.
In the data, because the mean ID for items judged old/new are
weighted means, the expected ID for items judged old/new are given by
the weighted expected IDs to hits and false alarms (items judged old), or
misses and correct rejections (items judged old), hence:
EIDZ O
P(H)E[IDH] P(F)E[IDF]
P(H) P(F)
,
and
EIDZN

1 P(H)E[IDM] [(1 P(F)]E[IDCR
2 P(H) P(F)
,
The overall fluency effect (see below) can be calculated as E[IDZN]
E[IDZ O].
We should note that the ID response variable is discrete but ismodeled
here as continuous (because fp N(p, f) and ID b sfp ep). To
justify this way of modeling ID, parameter recovery simulations were
performed. In these simulations, first, recognition judgment and ID data
(for 10,000 old/new items) were simulated from a given model. The
parameter values used for this were themean estimated parameter values
for the KOR group (given on the right-hand side of Table 1). The simu-
Table 1. Mean (SD) of themodel parameters
Aggregate fits Individual fits
SS MS1 MS2 SS MS1 MS2
Parameter Meaning KOR CON KOR CON KOR CON KOR CON KOR CON KOR CON
rold M(frold) 0.69 2.48 0.72 2.49 0.72 2.49 1.06 2.66 1.01 2.66 1.01 2.66
(0.76) (0.57) (0.83) (0.57) (0.83) (0.57)
pold M(fpold) rold rold 0.51 2.18 0.51 2.18 rold rold 0.83 2.54 0.92 2.53
(0.66) (1.20) (0.69) (1.15)
w r(fr , fp )  1  1  0  0 1.00 1.00  1  1  0  0 0.82 0.62
(0.35) (0.43)
C Judgment criterion 0.69 1.45 0.71 1.45 0.71 1.46 0.80 1.55 0.77 1.55 0.77 1.55
(0.83) (0.43) (0.78) (0.43) (0.78) (0.43)
b ID intercept 6.51 6.23 6.45 6.18 6.45 6.18 6.53 6.22 6.53 6.22 6.53 6.22
(0.90) (1.47) (0.89) (1.47) (0.89) (1.47)
s ID slope 0.68 0.31  SS  SS  SS  SS 0.57 0.25  SS  SS  SS  SS
(0.55) (0.21)
p SD(ep ) 1.88 2.36 1.89 2.36 1.88 2.36 1.59 1.73 1.59 1.73 1.58 1.72
(0.32) (0.38) (0.32) (0.38) (0.32) (0.38)
f SD(fr ), SD(fp ) 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2
r SD(er ) f f f f f f f f f f f f
M(ep ) M priming task noise  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
M(er ) M recognition task noise  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
rnew M(frnew)  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
pnew M(fpnew) rnew rnew  0  0  0  0 rnew rnew  0  0  0  0
A value preceded by an equals sign indicates that the value was fixed, otherwise it was free to vary in fitting the data.
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lated ID values were then rounded to the nearest integer; if the value was
1 or10, then it was rounded to 1 or 10, respectively, thereby produc-
ing discretized ID data. The simulated ID and judgment data were then
fit by themodels as described above, and the estimates of the free param-
eters were compared with the values of the parameters that were origi-
nally used to simulate the data (i.e., the true parameter values). For all
models, the estimated parameter values matched the true parameter val-
ues. This demonstrates that the parameters of the models can still be
recovered, even though the ID data are discrete.
Another issue concerns the function used to relate fp to ID level. The
amount of a test picture revealed across levels varies by an exponential
function, whereas the equation relating ID level to fp in the models is
linear. It is possible that an alternative function relating ID to fp would
provide amore complete characterization of the ID data and improve the
performance of all of the models. However, most important for current
purposes is that ID is modeled as a monotonically decreasing function of
fp in all models. We chose to model the ID variable in this way for
consistency with previous applications of the models, and for ease of
model specification.
Model predictions. Three key predictions are made by the SS model.
These predictions follow from the assumption that greater values of f
tend to lead to a greater likelihood of an old judgment and also better
performance in the priming task (i.e., greater values of Jr and lower values
of ID; Fig. 2). Prediction 1 is that, given a deficit in recognition in amnesic
individuals, a deficit in priming should also be evident. This is because
changes in old will tend to affect overall levels of both recognition and
priming. However, the effect on priming can be smaller in magnitude
than for recognition because of the greater variance of the noise associ-
ated with the priming task that is typically assumed (Berry et al., 2006).
TheMS1 andMS2models can reproduce any pattern of recognition and
priming, and so do not make this prediction in advance.
Predictions 2 and 3 concern performance in the priming task when bro-
ken down by recognition response (Fig. 2). Prediction 2 is that, within old
and new items, items that are judged old are likely to be identified at greater
levels of fragmentation than items judged new (this is often referred to as a
“fluency effect”; Conroy et al., 2005): Items with values of Jr that exceed the
criterionC are judged old and tend to have larger f values than items judged
new.Because the same fvaluedrives identification, items judgedoldwill tend
tobe identifiedatmore fragmented levels. Prediction3concerns thepriming
effect for items judged new. This effect has been reported in numerous stud-
ies, andon the surface appears to indicate that recognition andpriminghave
distinct memorial bases since priming occurs in the absence of overt recog-
nition (Berry et al., 2008a). The SSmodel predicts that themagnitude of the
priming effect (i.e., the identification advantage of all old items relative to
new items) will be greater than the priming effect within the subset of items
judged new (i.e., the identification advantage for old items judged new rela-
tive to new items judged new). This is because values of Jr tend to be greater
for old items than new items, even within the subset of items judged new.
However, thedifference in Jr betweenalloldandnewitems isgreater than the
difference in Jr between old and new itemswithin the subset of items judged
new (Fig. 2). Because differences in Jr tend to reflect differences in f, the
priming effect across all items will tend to be greater than the priming effect
within the subset of items judged new. (Though differences in Jr do not
always reflect differences in f, as is the case, for example,with false-alarmand
miss responses; Berry et al., 2008a.) Predictions 2 and 3 are notmade by the
MS1model because IDand Jr are uncorrelatedwithin item type (Fig. 2). The
MS2 model can produce the same results as the SS model with regard to
Predictions2and3,but thegreater flexibilityof thismodelmeans that it does
not make these predictions in advance.
Results
SSmodel prediction 1
Recognition memory was significantly lower in the KOR group
(n 24) than in the CON group (n 24; Figs. 3a, 4a): Pr, t(46)
9.31, p  0.001 (Cohen’s d  2.69); d	, t(46)  8.21, p  0.001
(KOR group, d	, 1.00; SE, 0.17; CON group, d	, 2.64; SE, 0.11),
consistent with thememory disorder in these individuals. Recog-
nition was reliably greater than chance (i.e., d	 or Pr 0) in both
groups (t values5.31, d values1.08), and there was no signif-
icant difference in C between the groups (t(46) 1.23, p 0.23,
d 0.36: mean C: KOR group, 0.50; SE, 0.21; CON group, 0.23;
SE, 0.08).
Figure 2. Model representations and Predictions 2 and 3. The top panels illustrate the relationship between the ID (identification level) and Jr variables in the models. The ellipses represent
bivariate normal distributions of each class of item (old or new), cut horizontally and centered on a point that represents the mean Jr and ID for that class of item. Prediction 2 concerns whether ID
levels are facilitated for items judged old within new and old items, that is, whether themean ID of false alarms is less than that of correct rejections [CRs; i.e., CR false alarm (FA)], and whether
the mean ID of hits is less than of misses (i.e., MISS HIT), where a correct rejection is a new judgment to a new item, a false alarm is an old judgment to a new item, a miss is a new judgment to
an old item, and a hit is an old judgment to an old item. Prediction 3 concerns whether the priming effect overall (across all items) is greater than the priming effect for items judged new. Priming
is calculated asmean ID(new items)mean ID(old items); priming for items judgednew is calculated asmean ID(CR)mean ID(FA). The SSmodel predicts positive differences between ID(CR)
ID(MISS), ID(MISS) ID(HIT), andprimingpriming items judgednew.TheMS1modelpredictsnodifferences. TheMS2modelpredicts positivedifferenceswhen theexplicit and implicit strengths
of an item are positively correlated (i.e.,w 0), and predicts no differences when there is no correlation (i.e.,w 0).
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Priming was calculated as the mean identification level for
new itemsminus themean identification level for old items. Both
groups showed reliable (i.e., 0) levels of priming: KOR group:
mean, 0.35; SE, 0.11; t(23)  3.18, p  0.004, d  0.65; CON
group:mean, 0.68; SE, 0.14; t(23) 4.78, p 0.001, d 0.98 (Figs.
3b, 4a). Crucially, priming was significantly lower in the KOR
group than in the CONgroup (t(46) 1.84; p 0.036, one-tailed;
d 0.53), as predicted by the SS model. Furthermore, there was
Figure3. Recognition andpriming task performance.a, Proportion of hit and false-alarm responses in theKORandCONgroups.b, Fragment identification performance according towhether the
object during the test is actuallyneworold, or judgedneworold. c, Fragment identificationperformance classifiedaccording to the recognition response [correct rejection (CR),miss, false alarm(FA),
hit] in the KOR and CON groups. Bars indicate experimental data (error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals of the mean). Symbols indicate the expected result from eachmodel when fit to data
aggregated across individuals (a and b; because the data in these figures are derived from all of the participants) or themean expected result from eachmodel when fit to each individual’s data (c;
because the data in these figures are derived from the subset of participants with responses in all four recognition categories). In c, the letters represent the individuals in each group.
10968 • J. Neurosci., August 13, 2014 • 34(33):10963–10974 Berry et al. •Modeling Recognition and Priming in Amnesia
no significant difference in the mean identification level for new
items across groups (Fig. 3b; t(46)  0.74, p  0.47, d  0.21),
which indicated that any difference in priming across groups
could not be attributed to differences in baseline levels of perfor-
mance in the task. Identifications were made at all possible frag-
mentation levels (range, 1–10 in both groups; interquartile range:
KOR group, 5–8; CON group, 4–8).
SSmodel predictions 2 and 3
To test Predictions 2 and 3, the identification level of each item
during testing was analyzed according to the following four pos-
sible recognition responses: a correct rejection is a new judgment
to a new item; a false alarm is an old judgment to a new item; a
miss is a new judgment to an old item; and a hit is an old judg-
ment to an old item (Fig. 3c). A subset of participants made no
responses in at least one of the four response categories, and so
they were not included in the following analyses. There were five
participants from the CON group: one had a hit rate of 1; and
four had a false alarm rate of 0. Nine participants were also ex-
cluded from the KOR group on this basis: one had a hit rate of 1;
one had a false alarm rate of 1; and seven had a false alarm rate of
0. The priming scores in the excluded participants were slightly
Figure 4. Model prediction results.a, Recognition discrimination (Pr: proportion of hits proportion of false alarms) and priming (i.e., fragment identification advantage for old objects) for the
KORandCONgroups. Fluency effects (i.e., fragment identification advantage for objects judgedold) across all items are also presented. Prediction 1 of the SSmodel is confirmedby lower recognition
andpriming in theKORgroup than in theCONgroup.b, Differences in the ID level for items judgedold versus judgednewwithinnewandold item types, anddifferences in theprimingeffect (overall)
and the priming effect of items judged new. Predictions 2 and 3 of the SSmodel are confirmed in the KOR group. Bars indicate experimental data (error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals of the
mean). Symbols indicate the expected result fromeachmodelwhen fit to data aggregated across individuals (a; because the data are derived fromall of the participants) or themeanexpected result
from each model when fit to each individual’s data (b; because the data are derived from the subset of participants with responses in all four recognition categories).
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higher than in the full set of participants
(KOR group: mean, 0.45; CON group:
mean, 0.89). In the CON group, the ex-
cluded participants tended to have slightly
higher recognition scores (d	  3.17, Pr
0.82); however, in the KOR group, the
recognition scores were similar to the pre-
exclusion group mean (d	  1.07, Pr 
0.17). The excluded KOR participants did
not appreciably differ from the pre-
exclusion KOR group in terms of age
(mean age, 49.33 years), NART-IQ score
(mean score, 89.00), RBMT (mean score,
6.22), or education level (mean level,
4.11). Listwise deletion of these partici-
pants did not result in any qualitative
changes in the recognition and priming
differences reported, with the exception
that the difference in the priming effects
between the groups was only marginal
(t(32)  1.51, p  0.07, d  0.53, one-
tailed; KOR group: mean, 0.30; SE, 0.14;
CON group: mean, 0.64; SE, 0.16); thus,
there is need for a little caution in the
claim of a deficit in priming in this KOR group. However, the
priming effect in the KOR group subset (d  0.52) was still
smaller than that of that of the CON group (d  0.90), and was
only marginally significantly different from chance (t(14) 2.09,
p 0.055), which is, at least, still consistent with a deficit.
As predicted by the SS model (Prediction 2), in the KOR
group, mean identification levels for items judged old were lower
than those of items judgednewwithin new andold items: ID(cor-
rect rejection) versus ID(false alarm): t(14) 3.04, p 0.009, d
0.42; ID(miss) vs ID(hit): t(14) 3.98, p 0.001, d 0.74 (Fig.
4b). Furthermore, as predicted by the SS model (Prediction 3),
the magnitude of the priming effect for items judged new [calcu-
lated as ID(correct rejection) ID(miss)] was significantly lower
than the priming effect for items judged new in the KOR group
(t(14)  2.51, p  0.025, d  0.51). However, the priming effect
for items judged new was not reliable in this group (t(14) 0.083,
p 0.94, d 0.02). Similar trends regarding Predictions 2 and 3
were evident in the CON group; however, these were not reliable
(Fig. 4b): Prediction 2: ID(correct rejection) versus ID(false
alarm), t(18) 1.50, p 0.15, d 0.23; ID(miss) versus ID(hit),
t(18)  1.29, p  0.21, d  0.15; Prediction 3: t(18)  1.18, p 
0.25, d  0.28. The priming effect for items judged new was,
however, reliable in the CON group (t(18) 2.89, p 0.01, d
0.29). A 2 (item type: old, new)  2 (judgment: old, new)  2
(group: CON, KOR) ANOVA was also conducted on the identi-
fication levels. There was a significant main effect of judgment,
F(1,32)  21.23, p  0.001, p
2  0.40, indicating that identifica-
tion levels tended to be lower for items judged old versus new.No
other main effects or interactions were significant (main effect of
item type: F(1,32)  3.28, p  0.08; all other F values 2.33, p
values0.137, p
2 values0.09).
Model fits
Table 2 shows the fit of the models to the data, and Table 1 shows
the best-fitting parameter estimates of the SS, MS1, and MS2
models. When fit to the data aggregated across participants, the
SS model provided the best fit to the CON group (indicated by
the lowest AIC value in Table 2), but theMS2model provided the
best fit to the KOR group. However, the differences in AIC be-
tween the SS and MS2 models are very small (a difference of 1.2
for the CON group, and 0.3 for the KOR group), indicating that
both models fit the data almost as well as each other (Burnham
and Anderson, 2002). Furthermore, as shown in Table 1, the
best-fitting value of w in the MS2 model was equal to 1, and the
values of rold and pold were also very similar within groups, sug-
gesting that the MS2 model fits the data best when it behaves more
like the SS model. When the models were fit to each individual, the
SSmodel provided the best fit to both groups (Table 2), and theAIC
was substantially smaller for the SS model compared with the MS1
andMS2models (i.e.,10), indicating substantial support for theSS
model (BurnhamandAnderson,2002).Themajorityofparticipants
Figure5. Model selection results. Each bar represents the percentage of participants best fit by eachmodel according to theAIC
and the BIC in the CON and KOR groups. The SS model was the best-fitting model for the majority of participants, with the
remainder being best fit by the MS1 model.
Table 2. Goodness-of-fit values for themodels
Data fit Group
SS MS1 MS2
p ln(L) AIC* BIC† p ln(L) AIC* BIC† p ln(L) AIC* BIC†
Aggregated KOR (z 1) 5 5172.7 10,355.4 10,383.2 5 5196.7 10,403.4 10,431.3 6 5171.5 10,355.1 10,388.5
CON (z 1) 5 5035.2 10,080.4 10,108.2 5 5042.7 10,095.4 10,123.2 6 5034.8 10,081.6 10,115.0
Individual KOR (z 15) 5 2925.5 6001.1 6382.8 5 2943.3 6036.7 6418.4 6 2922.1 6024.2 6482.3
CON (z 19) 5 3444.8 7079.6 7585.6 5 3446.2 7082.4 7588.4 6 3443.2 7114.5 7721.7
For the aggregate fits, data from all 24 participants are modeled as if from one participant (hence z 1, where z is the (effective) number of participants modeled in each experiment). For the individual fits, it was not possible to model
participants who had zero hit, miss, false alarm, or correct rejection responses (hence z values24). A smaller AIC or BIC value indicates greater support for a model. BOLD indicates that the model fit the data best according to the AIC
measure.
*The AIC is calculated as follows: AIC2ln(L) 2 P, where P p z is the total number of free parameters for each fit, p is the number of free parameters for each model.
†The BIC is calculated as follows: BIC2ln(L) Pln(q), where q is the number of observations q(Aggregated, KOR group) 1920, q(Aggregated, CON group) 1920, q(Individual, KOR group) 1200, q(Individual, CON group)
1520].
10970 • J. Neurosci., August 13, 2014 • 34(33):10963–10974 Berry et al. •Modeling Recognition and Priming in Amnesia
in eachgroupwerebest fit by theSSmodel,with the remainderbeing
best fit by the MS1 model (Fig. 5). The BIC results also tended to
support the SSmodel (Table 2, Fig. 5).
The expected model results are indicated by the symbols in
Figures 3 and 4. All models closely reproduced the key trends in
the data: recognition and priming were lower in the KOR group
than the CON group (Prediction 1); and the SS andMS2 models
predicted nonzero differences between ID(correct rejection) and
ID(false alarm), ID(miss) and ID(hit) (Prediction 2), and also
between priming overall and for items judged new (Prediction 3;
Fig. 4). The MS1 model did not, however, predict any of these
differences (Fig. 4).
Data from individual patients who show normal priming de-
spite a complete absence of recognition memory (e.g., patient
E.P.; Hamann and Squire, 1997; Stefanacci et al., 2000; Conroy et
al., 2005) is particularly challenging for single-system accounts
(Berry et al., 2012). Three densely amnesic patients from this
study who showed priming despite performing at/near chance in
recognition yielded results that did not clearly provide evidence
for any model, but it is important to stress that their results were
not incompatible with the SSmodel (Figs.
6, 7, patients A–C). Patient A was female,
51 years of age, with a NART-IQ score of
109, an RBMT score of 4, and an educa-
tion level of 5; patient Bwasmale, 54 years
of age, with a NART-IQ score of 101, an
RBMT score of 2, and an education level
of 5; and patient C was male, 59 years of
age, with a NART-IQ score of 87, an
RBMT score of 12, and an education level
of 2.
Patients B and C were best fit by the
MS1model, andpatientAby the SSmodel
(though the differences in AIC between
the best-fitting models were small—4).
The mean priming effect in this subgroup
was 0.59 (SE, 0.20), which is lower than
the priming effect shown in the CON
group (mean, 0.68; SE, 0.14), but still
within the 95% confidence interval of the
CON groupmean (Fig. 4). From Figure 7,
a and b, it is evident that theMS1 andMS2
models closely fit the recognition and
priming results, whereas the SS model
predicts a small amount of recognition in
these patients, and a lower magnitude of
priming thanwas evident in these individ-
uals. From Figure 7, b and c, it is evident
that (1) priming in patient A, but not pa-
tients inB andC,was below the lower 95%
confidence interval of mean priming in
the CON group; (2) all patients showed a
fluency effect within old items, and pa-
tients A andC, but not patient B, showed a
fluency effect within new items; and (3)
patients A and B, but not patient C,
showed a greater priming effect than the
priming effect for items judged new.
Thus, results 2 and 3, and to a lesser extent
result 1, are largely compatible with the
predictions of the SS model (and also the
MS2 model). It is noteworthy that the SS
model is able to reproduce a substantial priming effect in patient
B despite very low recognition.
Discussion
Contrary to longstanding views that recognition memory and
repetition priming are driven by distinct memory systems
(Squire, 2009), this study showed that numerous results in am-
nesic patients could be predicted in advance by a single-system
model: (1) reliable deficits in recognition and priming were
found relative to the control subjects; (2) items judged old were
identified at greater levels of fragmentation than items judged
newwithin both old and new items; and (3) themagnitude of the
priming effect overall was greater than the priming effect for
items judged new (though note that priming for items judged
new was not reliable in the KOR group). Findings 2 and 3 were
not predicted by the MS1 model, but were reproduced by the
MS2 model. The AIC and BIC model evidence measures, how-
ever, indicated that there was greater support for the SS model
than the MS2 model. Thus, overall, the data from the amnesic
patients favored the SS model over the MS1 and MS2 models.
a
b
Figure 6. Best-fitting models for each participant (according to the AIC; individual level fits). a, b, The best fitting models are
plotted according to Pr and priming (mean identification newmean identification old) performance (a) and the difference in ID
levels for items judged old and new (i.e., fluency effects)within old and new items (b). It is evident that the participants in the KOR
groupwhowerebest fit by theMS1model tended to showpriming (or recognition) in thenear absence of recognition (or priming).
TheMS1model can reproduce such a pattern because therold andpold parameters can vary independently of one another. In
the CONgroup, therewere also participantswhowere best fit by theMS1model even though they showed relatively large positive
recognition andpriming effects. These participants tended to showanabsence of fluency effects (or even anegative fluency effect)
within old or new items (b, right). Because fp and fr are uncorrelated in the MS1 model, it does not predict fluency effects within
old/new items. Thus, the participants best fit by the MS1 model appeared to exhibit results that were consistent with its predic-
tions. The letters A, B, and C above the points in the KOR group label patientswho showed priming effects despite performing very
close to chance in recognition.
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Findings 2 and 3 are therefore in agree-
ment with a previous study that found
similar results in normal adults (Berry et
al., 2012).
The deficit in priming found in the
KOR group in this study contrasts with
the widely held view that priming is pre-
served in amnesia. Although priming is
frequently found to be preserved in amne-
sia (Gabrieli, 1998), many studies, like
ours, have also reported deficits (War-
rington and Weiskrantz, 1968; Cermak et
al., 1993; Verfaellie et al., 1996; Oster-
gaard, 1999; Verfaellie and Cermak, 1999;
Meier et al., 2009). When Korsakoff pa-
tients are specifically considered, priming
deficits are often reported when the prim-
ing task is picture fragment completion
(Hayes et al., 2012). There are different
interpretations of such priming deficits.
InKS, one account is that they reflectvisuo-
perceptual impairments (Hayes et al., 2012).
However, such an account does not ap-
pear to explain the priming deficit found
in this study because baseline levels of
identification (fragment identification
levels for new items) did not differ be-
tween theKORandCONgroups, suggest-
ing that the visuoperceptual abilities of
the groups were appropriately matched.
One possible multiple-systems interpretation of the deficit in
priming is that priming is greater in theCONgroupbecause these
individuals use their greater capacity for explicit memory to re-
trieve studied items frommemory during the identification por-
tion of a trial; doing so increases the magnitude of priming
relative to the amnesic patients (Squire et al., 1985). Although
possible, there is evidence to suggest that such an account is un-
likely to apply to our data. For example, this type of explicit
contamination of fragment identification performance is
deemed more likely to occur (and be more effective) when par-
ticipants identify fragments at both study and test. Under these
conditions, an association between the fragment and the picture
name can be formed during the study phase and then be recalled
during the test phase (Verfaellie et al., 1996). In our study, how-
ever, participants only identified fragments during the test phase,
so there was no opportunity for specific fragment–picture name
associations to be formed during the study phase. Moreover, in
experiments using a CID-R task with normal adults, it has been
found that even under conditions that appear optimal for using
an explicit retrieval strategy in a CID-R task (i.e., informing the
participant whether the upcoming trial will contain an old or new
item), there was no evidence of greater priming than under typ-
ical testing conditions (Ward et al., 2013; for a similar finding, see
also Brown et al., 1991; for a discussion of explicit contamination
in a similar task, see also Ostergaard, 1998, 1999).
The SSmodel explains the deficits in the KOR group as arising
from the weaker strength of a single underlying memory signal
for studied items relative to the CON group. Interestingly, the
effect of KS was larger on recognition than on priming (Cohen’s
d: recognition, 2.69; priming, 0.53), and this was captured by the
SS model (Cohen’s d: recognition, 2.27; priming, 0.51). The SS
model is able to predict this interaction because there is not a 1:1
mapping between strength and performance; the signal is scaled
differently and is subjected to different sources of noise for each
task. That a singlememory strength signal is expressed differently
in two tasks in the SS model is conceptually similar to other
models in which a single underlying memory trace is accessed in
different ways depending upon the retrieval process (Greve et al.,
2010). The difference in effect sizes predicted by the SS model is
one possible explanation for why deficits are more frequently
found in recognition than priming in amnesia. Consistent with
this is the finding that priming tasks are typically less reliable than
recognition tasks (Buchner andWippich, 2000); indeed, the reli-
ability of the recognition andpriming tasks in our study tended to
confirm this (see Materials and Methods).
In the CONgroup, numerical trends were found in support of
Predictions 2 and 3, but these were not reliable. This ismost likely
due to low power: the number of misses and false alarms in the
CON group was relatively low (CON group: median, 5 misses, 2
false alarms; KOR group:median, 16misses, 11 false alarms), and
so the variability in identification levels for these responses was
relatively high (Fig. 3c). Clear evidence of Predictions 2 and 3 in
normal adults has, however, been found across three experiments
by Berry et al. (2012) with normal adults. They used a greater
number of stimuli than this study (72–150 vs 40 old/new items),
and overall levels of recognition were lower (d	 values 1.5 vs
2.64), which resulted in more false alarms and misses.
One potential concern with the CID-R task is that the identi-
fication portion of the trial may affect the recognition judgment.
This may be deemed likely since recognition and priming trials
are necessarily interleaved due to the nature of the task. Early
dual-process theories of recognition proposed that perceptual
fluency can act as one basis of recognition (Mandler, 1980; Jacoby
and Dallas, 1981), and studies have shown that the probability of
an old judgment to an item is greater if the rate at which it clarifies
from a mask is fast rather than slow (Johnston et al., 1991). In
a b
c
Figure 7. Performance of the KOR group patients A, B, and C (as labeled in Figs. 3c, 6). a–c, Recognition (a), priming (b),
and differences (c) in ID levels for items judged new and old within old and new items (i.e., fluency effects), and differences
in the priming effect (overall) and the priming effect of items judged new (Predictions 2 and 3 of the SSmodel). Bars denote
data, and symbols indicate the expected result from each model when fit to the data from each individual. The dashed lines
in a and b indicate the lower 95% confidence interval for the mean recognition and priming performance, respectively, in
the CON group (Fig. 4).
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other words, a relatively fluent identification can be attributed to
prior exposure. It is therefore possible that the relations between
priming and recognition that we find are accentuated by the
CID-R task. However, there is evidence from similar studies that
have used blocked designs, which demonstrate that the within-
item recognition-priming measure associations of the kind ob-
served in this study are not dependent upon the interleaved
nature of the CID-R task (Ostergaard, 1998; Sheldon and Mos-
covitch, 2010; see also discussion in Berry et al., 2012).
An important question is whether the SS model extends to
other explicit tasks that are more reliant upon recollection (i.e.,
remembering prior context). Berry et al. (2012) found some evi-
dence for this using a modified CID-R task with remember–
know judgments (Tulving, 1985). Remember judgments are
widely thought to measure a recollection memory process
(Yonelinas, 2002). Berry et al. (2012) found that identification
response times to items given remember judgments were faster
than for those given know judgments (commonly thought to
measure a familiarity process), and this was predicted by the SS
model. In future research, it will be important to determine
whether the model extends to other tasks that are reliant upon
recollection such as source memory.
Finally, a remaining issue is whether the SSmodel can explain
the kind of dissociation that is opposite to that reported in am-
nesia, namely, evidence of brain regions that support priming but
not recognition. Although initial neuropsychological studies in-
dicated that the right occipital lobe was such a region (Gabrieli et
al., 1995), subsequent investigations have not corroborated this
(Yonelinas et al., 2001; Kroll et al., 2003). Nevertheless, it is clear
that regions outside the medial temporal lobe are involved in
priming (and also recognition; Schacter et al., 2007), and one
avenue for future researchwill be to determine how the activity of
different regions maps onto the single strength signal in the SS
model.
To conclude, the results from amnesic patients supported the
predictions of the SS model. Numerous results were inconsistent
with the MS1 model; this suggests that recognition and priming
are not driven by completely independent explicit and implicit
memory signals. Like the SS model, the MS2 model could ac-
count for the data. TheMS2model explains the deficits in recog-
nition and priming in amnesia as reductions in the strength of
both the explicit and implicit memory signals. There is also a
substantial degree of association between the explicit and implicit
memory strengths of a given item according to thismodel. The SS
model, however, tended to be preferred according to model evi-
dence measures and could predict the majority of results in am-
nesia in advance. Thus, the SSmodel appears to provide themost
parsimonious account for the pattern of recognition and priming
in amnesia found in this study.
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